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Introduction
Japan's techno-industrial regime, which I call "relationalism," has proved remarkably
resilient in the face of powerful market and political forces for change.' Despite a decade
of slow or no growth, it continues to be held together by a dense web of longstanding and
mutually reinforcing relationships between government and business, between nominally
independent firms, and between labor and management.
This is not to say that Japan is immutable. It clearly is undergoing change in the
distribution of economic gains and losses, as evidenced by growing income inequality. The
"big tent" of relationalism today protects fewer Japanese citizens than it has at any other
time in the post-war period. But the tent itself is still standing tall.
Consider some of the following claims made by those who say Japan is undergoing
significant structural change, as well as evidence suggesting the contrary:
* The government has implemented regulatory and administrative reforms that
appear to diminish its once significant role in private market matters. However,
the number of regulations imposed by the Japanese state between 1996 and
1998 was 8.6 percent higher than the number imposed between 1986 and 1988,
the beginning of a decade of supposed kisei kanwa (easing of regulations). And
the number of retiring bureaucrats who used the practice of amakudari
("descent from heaven") to take up positions in the private sector (often in firms
they used to regulate) actually increased by 14.4 percent between 1986-88 and
1996-98.2
* Horizontal keiretsu ties between firms seem to be unraveling as main banks
from different corporate groups merge. At a deeper level, though, one can see
that these ties are "re-raveling" as four consolidated keiretsu take the place of
the old six. Industry tie-ups, such as the ones between Sumitomo Chemicals and
Mitsui Chemicals and between NKK (part of the old Fuyo Group) and
Kawasaki Steel (part of the old Dai-ichi Kangyo Group) are following the
pattern of bank mergers, such as the ones between Sumitomo Bank and what
used to be called Mitsui Bank and between Fuji Bank and Dai-ichi Kangyo
Bank.3
* In the automobile industry, vertical keiretsu linkages between manufacturing
assemblers and their longtime subcontractors appear to be dissolving as foreign
firms such as Renault and Daimler Chrysler acquire dominant positions in
heavily indebted domestic firms such as Nissan (with an estimated $21 billion
in debt in 1999) and Mitsubishi Motors ($15 billion in 2000). Cost-cutting
managers at these troubled automakers have sought to streamline the system of
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parts procurement. On the other hand, competitive automakers such as Toyota
and Honda have maintained or even strengthened ties with keiretsu suppliers.
For example, in the late 1990s, Toyota increased its equity stake in its three
largest suppliers (Denso, Toyota Gosei, and Aishin).4
* Japan suddenly seems open to foreign direct investment. Thanks to hefty
investments in the automobile industry and financial services sector, foreign
capital has indeed increased its position in Japan -- but remains relatively
miniscule. In the 1990s, the total flow of FDI into Japan in the 1990s was $26
billion -- smaller than any other major industrialized country and less than 3
percent the amount of FDI that found its way into the US during that decade.
* Firms appear to be restructuring by trimming payrolls. However, they in fact are
achieving such reductions through natural attrition and the transfer of surplus
workers to affiliated firms or dedicated subcontractors. For core employees
(who are, for the most part, male, middle-aged, and skilled), the job turnover
rate remains about 4 percent a year -- not significantly higher than it was in the
mid-1980s. 5
What, then, explains the remarkable durability of Japan's embattled techno-industrial
regime? In this chapter, I argue that Japanese government and business elites have rescued
- temporarily - the system of relationalism by regionalizing it, by extending its web of
relational ties into developing Asia,6 where such ties still serve a useful economic function.
In doing so, however, they have preserved the status quo at home and thereby delayed
needed reforms.
This chapter proceeds in six steps: First, I define relationalism more carefully; second, I
offer an economic analysis of this techno-industrial regime, demonstrating that its costs
began to outweigh its benefits after Japan achieved "catch-up" development; third, I show
how Japanese elites sought to extend the shelf life of relationalism by regionalizing it;
fourth, I suggest that this process of regionalization was slowed but not stopped by the
Asian fiscal crisis of 1997-98; fifth, I assert that the regionalization of relational networks
reflects Japanese techno-nationalism, the quest for power or autonomy through control of
strategic economic resources; and sixth, I show how regionalization, by rescuing
relationalism, has served to restrict the growth potential of the Japanese economy.
1. Relationalism
A techno-industrial regime is a) the set of actors (bureaucrats, corporate managers, and
labor elites) who generate and utilize knowledge for industrial production in a specific
social and spatial context; b) the set of norms that unite and motivate these actors; and c)
the set of institutions through which these actors exchange information.7 When it operates
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on the level of the nation-state, a techno-industrial regime is much like what Nelson
(1993), Lundvall (1992) and others refer to as a "national system of innovation."
Although squeezed by globalization and subjected to pressures for convergence, Japan's
techno-industrial regime remains quite unlike the relatively neo-liberal and atomistic
regimes found in the United States and the United Kingdom. Relationships matter far
more. For example, Japanese government officials still collaborate closely with business
executives on industrial policies. In 1998, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(METI, better known in the past as MITI) crafted a seven-year plan to aid the satellite
industry through a series of joint research projects8 ; in 1999, it joined other ministries in
developing a "national strategy" of catching up with the U.S. and Europe in
biotechnology9; and in 2000, it set up a strategic council to promote the fledgling
information technology industry.' ° Furthermore, Japanese corporations continue to
maintain longstanding, mutually reinforcing ties with one another via cross shareholding.
In a new survey, 719 of 731 major firms reported that they are owned, at least in part, by
"stable" shareholders who do not trade such stock. Of those 719 firms, two-thirds indicated
indicated that more than 50 percent of their outstanding shares are held in this way. And
finally, three-quarters of the firms reported that longtime employees, promoted through the
ranks, occupy at least half of the seats on their board of directors." 
To an unusual degree, then, Japan's techno-industrial regime has been - and continues to
be -- guided by norms and institutions of cooperation, or what I call "relationalism."' 2
Thus, the Economic Planning Agency of Japan concludes that this system "emphasizes the
merits of cooperation based on long-term relationships between economic actors and
within economic institutions. In this way, each economic actor has been able to avoid the
risks associated with fierce competition, maximizing its self-interest by forging alliances
within the market."' 3
Relationalism in Japan is manifested in three strands of strong, cooperative ties between
co-nationals. These are:
* Government-business ties. It is often difficult to distinguish the public from the
private sector in Japan, where bureaucrats and business executives routinely
confer over policy. Such cooperation often takes the form of "administrative
guidance" (gy6sei shid6), an informal policy negotiating process that sometimes
is initiated by the state and sometimes by industry.
* Business-business ties. In Japan, as in all market-oriented regimes that
recognize private property rights, competition between firms is encouraged --
but only up to a point. "Excess competition," manifested in bankruptcies and
layoffs, is unwelcome. As a result, firms routinely cooperate through a variety
of non-market institutions such as trade associations and keiretsu designed to
stabilize the market. Keiretsu include a) horizontally organized groups such as
Mitsui and Mitsubishi with a main bank, a trading company, and member-firms
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in a variety of different industries, as well as b) vertically organized groups that
link the manufacturers of finished goods with parts suppliers and distributors.
Labor-management ties. Because they invest so heavily in on-the-job training,
large companies in Japan rarely resort to lay-offs. Instead, they encourage
employees to stay on the job by offering seniority-based wages, as well as
private pension funds and other company-specific benefits. Longtime (if not
"lifetime") employees organize themselves into enterprise unions that serve to
align the interests of workers and the interests of the company
To be sure, cooperative ties provide the internal "wiring" for virtually all social systems,
including a techno-industrial regime. These ties, however, are far stronger, far more
durable in Japan, which is why Sakakibara refers to it as a "non-capitalist market
economy." 14 Indeed, strong ties of cooperation have been routinized, and thus
institutionalized, in many other areas of the Japanese political economy, including some
areas that are critical for technological development. For example, manufacturers in Japan
do not usually recruit and hire young engineers directly from the nation's leading technical
schools. Instead, they negotiate with the students' faculty advisors, who have insisted on
adherence to an informally administered allocation scheme for each industry. This linkage
between industry and academia has helped maintain a rough parity in skill levels between
otherwise competing manufacturers, and has thus reinforced business-business
cooperation.
2. Development and Relationalism
Relationalism carries both costs and benefits. The costs are, for the most part, opportunity
costs associated with relatively dense and inward-looking networks that are thus closed to
new sources of information from the outside. The benefits are, for the most part, reduced
transaction costs associated with long-term, implicit contracting.
For Japan, the benefits of relationalism clearly outweighed the costs in the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s, when it was struggling to catch-up with more advanced industrial economies by
adopting and commercializing Western know-how, or -- to invoke Samuels' concept of a
"three-note chord" -- by pursuing technological autonomy and diffusion, and by nurturing
the private industries that use such know-how.1 5 Indeed, relationalism helped sustain the
momentum of development in Japan during this period.
In their critiques of neoclassical economic theory, Hirschman and Murakami distinguish
between mature or developed markets, which they believe the theory is quite capable of
modeling, and developing markets, which they contend the theory is woefully unable to
grasp.16 Hirschman focuses on what could be called "proto-development," an early phase
in the process when capital markets are characterized by problems of contract enforcement
and product markets are afflicted with imperfect or incomplete information - the makings,
in short, for a classic prisoners' dilemma. In this environment, risk-taking activities are
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impeded, Hirschman writes (p. 26), "by imperfections in the decision-making process."
Undeveloped economies become swamped by uncertainty due to a dizzying array of
"unexploited opportunities." To overcome these market failures, the state can provide an
important, even catalytic, function. It can virtually jump-start a stalled economy, providing
the needed spark.17
Murakami focuses on a later phase of the process - what could be called "dynamic
development" - in which firms in developing economies adopt successively more
sophisticated technology from the global pool of established know-how, thereby achieving
declining long-run average costs (LRAC) or, in other words, increasing returns.
Neoclassical theory, he argues, cannot grasp this process because it largely ignores the
variable of technological change. 8 It assumes that all markets are like those in mature or
developed economies, where firms do face increasing LRAC, and thus diminishing returns
(which create the upward sloping supply curve drawn in modern economics textbooks),
because they operate at the global technological frontier and thus cannot simply adopt
existing know-how.
For developing economies, then, the challenge is not merely the one described by
Hirschman; that is, how to launch the dynamic process of technological absorption. It also
includes the one described by Murakami; that is, how to sustain this process. That is
because development spawns social instability and economic inefficiency as firms race to
invest larger and larger sums in industries characterized by declining LRAC. Allowed to
run its course, this "investment race" will lead first to excess capacity and later to
bankruptcies and unemployment, both of which impose deadweight losses on a developing
economy. 19 Without some coordination, then, this "race" is likely to hit a dead-end by
spawning monopolistic or highly oligopolistic industries.
Japan, stitched together by the mutually reinforcing linkages of relationalism, avoided this
outcome and sustained its developmental momentum. At the macro-level, the ties between
government and business fostered a stable environment for firms to invest, step-by-
incremental step, in more advanced technologies. 20 And at the micro-level, the ties between
industry and universities, between firms, and within firms combined the benefits of
internalization (reduced transaction costs through constant information exchange) with the
benefits of marketization (reduced governance costs). In particular, these ties encouraged
the rapid diffusion of existing technology -- at least within the designated, socially
constructed channels.
Imai and Yamazaki argue that Japanese elites followed a Schumpeterian path, using a
series of overlapping networks -- centered around the large manufacturing firm -- to
develop and utilize new technologies.
The Japanese system is coordinated through multi-layered networks,
including inter-firm, inter-industry, inter-governments, universities and
corporations, and other networks, which have their own "micro-macro
5
information loop" as a linkage and coordinating method. The supplier
network is an example at the inter-firm level. MITI's well-known Industrial
Structure Council is at the inter-industry level. The "technopolis" is an
attempt to create a network of governments, universities, and corporations.
By the mid-1970s, relationalism had transformed Japan into an economic giant that had
leapfrogged from transitor radios and toys to TVs and VCRs to computers and
semiconductors. At the same time, however, Japan's techno-industrial regime began to
show its age. The costs of strong network ties -- manifested in collusive or rent-seeking
behavior and extremely rigid markets -- began to outweigh the benefits. This shift occured
because Japan had achieved technological "catch-up." Its firms, now operating at the global
technology frontier, could no longer capture market share merely by adopting existing
know-how and expanding output. Now they themselves had to engage in radical
innovation.
That Japan had achieved "catch-up" by this time is confirmed by figures on total factor
productivity (TFP), the weighted average of labor and capital productivity.2 2 For Japanese
manufacturers, the annual growth in TFP averaged 2.2 percent a year between 1955 and
1973, but then fell to only 0.75 percent a year between 1973 and 1980. Cameron constructs
an index of total factor productivity for Japanese industry, relative to the U.S., and
estimates that Japan's level was 61 percent of the U.S. level in 1955, 86.7 percent in 1973,
101.1 percent in 1980, and 98.8 percent in 1990.23
If Japan had, by the mid-1970s, exhausted the imitative possibilities inherent in "catch-up"
development, how then did it manage to keep outperforming Western economies in the late
1970s and 1980s? After all, Japan was the first industrialized country to recover from the
first oil crisis and its stagflationary effects. The answer is that Japanese firms disguised
their structural problems during this period by investing massive amounts of capital -- as
much as 41 percent of GDP in 1973 -- far more than other industrialized countries at the
time. These investments, however, proved less and less efficient, generating lower and
lower returns.24 Indeed, the rate of return on Japan's gross fixed capital stock fell
precipitously -- from 34 percent in 1955 to 18 percent in 1970, and continued to fall. Or, to
use a slightly different measure, a $1 increase in Japan's capital stock yielded less than a 20
cent increase in its GDP in the mid-1970s -- a miserable fraction of the $1.20 cent increase
it earned in the late 1960s.2 5
Capital investment remained high, eventually fueling a financial "bubble" characterized by
massive asset inflation, but Japan's technological development slowed during the 1980s. In
the computer industry, for example, the value-added to sales ratio "plunged steeply" --
from 30 percent in 1982 to 22 percent in 1991, according to Yamada and Okumura. This
industry, once imbued with great expectations for high growth, "joined the ranks of
ordinary manufacturing industries .... and is no longer a lucrative undertaking." 26
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What went wrong? Relationalism, it seems, outlived its utility and became a net drag on
the Japanese economy. But political and economic elites, reluctant to abandon the
investments they had made in relational networks, failed to carry out structural reform of
Japan's techno-industrial regime. 27 Bureaucrats continued to collaborate with business
executives in formulating and implementing industrial policies, but enjoyed less and less
success. As Callon notes: MITI (now METI) "discovered that pushing out on the
technology frontier was much more difficult than the catch-up policies that targeted
existing technologies that had been perfected by the United States."2 8 Meanwhile, major
corporations continued to use inter-firm and intra-firm ties to pursue market share
maximization, as they had all along, but no longer seemed able to maximize profits.2 9
Figure 1 reveals how large Japanese corporations began in the mid to late-1970s to earn far
lower returns than their counterparts in the United States.
It was not, however, until January 1991, when Japan's speculative "bubble" popped, that
political and economic elites faced a real crisis. Manufacturers struggled to hang onto sales
volumes as productivity declined slowly but steadily to the point that, by 1994, Japan's
productivity was about 34 percent lower than the U.S. rate.30 Profits suffered, too, as the
economy slumped into recession. Compounding the market pressures on Japan's techno-
industrial regime were political pressures from Japan's trading partners. In the first half of
the 1990s, the U.S pursued a new "results-oriented" and "managed trade" policy that took
aim at Japanese automobiles and electronics goods.3 1 Other countries, while not as
aggressive, also criticized Japan for its persistent trade surplus. In the latter half of that
decade, the U.S. pushed Japanese government officials to roll back regulations that inhibit
the development and expansion of new business activities.
This time, Japanese elites understood they could no longer tinker with the existing techno-
industrial regime. Two choices remained: they could dismantle it, relying more on spot
markets and less on firmly established relationships to carry out exchange. Or they could
try to expand its scope; that is, they could try to rescue relationalism by extending its social
networks into a new and more fertile environment in which firms might still be adopting
existing technology, and thus one in which relationalism might continue to generate net
gains.
An essay by a well-regarded economist reflected a new consensus. Japanese manufacturers,
Itami Hiroyuki wrote in 1993, had become hemmed in by two walls: the "wall of the
system" (Japan's outmoded techno-industrial regime), and the "wall of the world," which
he contended the West built to keep out Japanese manufactured imports. Asia, he wrote,
offered a way for Japanese manufacturers to clear both walls. With its young, still
developing economies, the region offered promise: cheap and plentiful land, affordable and
literate labor, and -- best of all - a set of welcoming arms. Asia beckoned, Itami wrote, and
Japanese manufacturers should respond by setting up plants in the region.3 2
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Regionalization, as we shall see, offered relief; that is, it opened a critical avenue for
reconfiguring, and thus rescuing, the increasingly fragile web of relationalism.
3. Regionalizing Relationalism
In the early 1990s, as Japan sank deeper and deeper into the Heisei recession, the nation's
interest in Asia seemed to rise higher and higher. Political and business elites brimmed
with enthusiasm about the region. In 1992, Hosoya Yuji, then deputy director of MITI's
industrial policy bureau declared that "Japan's main target [for trade and investment] must
be Asia." 33 A year later, Keidanren, Japan's big business federation, noted that Asia had
become "an indispensable part of the business and procurement activities of Japanese
companies." Economic ties between Japan and other countries in Asia benefit both sides,
and thus should be strengthened, according to the federation. "Japanese companies will
have to form a closer cooperative relationship in an effort to secure their international
competitiveness."34
This heightened rhetoric was matched by new initiatives in the region. For example, the
Japanese state stepped up its Official Development Assistance (ODA), providing $4.2
billion to Asia in 1995 -- a sharp increase over 1990, when it gave $3.1 billion. Although
most of this money came in the form of yen loans for dams, sewers, electrical transmission
lines and other infrastructure projects, an increasing amount came in the form of technical
assistance. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) dispatched more and more
Japanese "experts" to Asia, where they advised host governments and local industry on
everything from industrial policy to manufacturing quality standards. Table 1 documents
the increasing presence of JICA "experts" in Asia.
But the more dramatic action occured on the private side as Japanese industry began to
move aggressively into Asia. As Figure 2 shows, manufacturing investment in the region
climbed sharply in the first half of the 1990s, reaching $7.8 billion in 1995, or almost 42
percent of all foreign direct investment (FDI) by Japanese producers. Represented in terms
of projects rather than value of investment, the movement into Asia is even more
impressive: Two-thirds of all the factories set up overseas by Japanese firms are located in
Asia.3 5
In addition to traditional forms of FDI, Japanese manufacturers engaged heavily in what
are often called "intermediate" forms of overseas investment, particularly franchise
contracts and technology licensing agreements with Asian partners.36 As Table 2 indicates,
Japanese technology exports to Asia doubled between 1991 and 1996, when they reached
$2.75 billion. Since the mid-1990s, the region has received roughly half of all technology
exports from Japan.
More than anything else, it was this export of Japanese capital and technology that helped
weave together the economies of Asia, where intra-regional trade had -- until the economic
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crisis of 1997-98 -- grown faster than anywhere else in the world. Indeed, regional
integration has been driven largely by the business strategies of Japanese firms, or
networks of firms, which have sought to construct a hierarchical division of labor based on
the different but complementary factor endowments and industrial structures, and thus the
different but complementary comparative advantages, of Asian economies. Put simply,
Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) have tried to distribute production activities
among various locations in the region according to the technological level of the host
economy.37
Japanese electronics firms have pursued such strategies most aggressively, creating
vertically layered intra-firm or intra-network supply chains that use technology-intensive
production from Japan, capital-intensive production from the Asian NIEs, and labor-
intensive production from China and the ASEAN-4. More specifically, the Asian affiliates
of these Japanese MNCs assemble finished products with high-tech components imported
from Japan, slightly less complex parts imported from the Asian NIEs, and the most
simple, standardized parts from China and the ASEAN-4. For example, to manufacture
VCRs at its assembly plant in Bangi, Malaysia, Sony imports integrated circuits and other
high-tech components from Japan, and printed circuit boards from Singapore. It also
purchases tape decks, as well as many other standard parts, from local suppliers in
Malaysia, many of them Japanese.38
Automobile manufacturers, taking advantage of ASEAN programs (such as the 1988
Brand-to-Brand Complementation (BBC) scheme and the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation
(AICO) scheme) to reduce tariffs on certain kinds of intra-regional, intra-industry trade,
have built their own supply networks in Southeast Asia. In general, these involve swapping
parts that are produced in larger volumes at specified factories across the region, and then
assembling them in finished vehicles. Toyota, for example, used its affiliate in the
Philippines as a base for specialized production of transmissions, its affiliate in Indonesia
for gasoline engines, its affiliate in Malaysia for steering gears and electronic components,
and its affiliate in Thailand for diesel engines and pressed parts.39 In 1996, only four years
after it set up its regional production network, Toyota moved nearly $200 million in parts
between its plants in Southeast Asia.4 0
Tamura writes that Japanese MNCs are building a regional division of labor that
emphasizes technology-intensive "prototype" production in Japan and mass production of
standardized products in Asia. These manufacturers, he concludes, "view Japan and Asia
as one interconnected zone of activity...' "'
Indeed, it has become increasingly clear that Japanese manufacturers are trying to
regionalize the techno-industrial regime they helped establish over a number of years in
Japan. That is, they are seeking to extend into Asia their own embattled web of strong
relational ties. This should not surprise us. As Doremus, Keller, Pauly, and Reich have
demonstrated, MNCs are rarely "multinational" (or, to use their term, "global").42 In most
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cases, they possess a national identity that is shaped by the distinctive norms and
institutions embedded in their home country. Japanese MNCs are thus guided by the norms
and institutions of cooperation that make up relationalism, and they have found it easier to
replicate these norms and institutions in Asia, where they have some salience, than they
have in Europe or the Americas.
Government-business ties
The Japanese state, under pressure to quit meddling in the domestic market, has found a
new mission for itself in Asia. It serves as a midwife to Japanese manufacturers in the
region, working to help them realize their business strategies. In speeches and policy
reports, government officials have argued that a regional division of labor will contribute to
a dynamic process of "industrial sequencing" as more advanced economies in the region
"pass down" industries in which they no longer enjoy a comparative advantage -- much as
an older sibling passes down out-grown clothes to a younger sibling. They have called this
the "flying geese" pattern of regional economic development, a V-shaped pattern with
Japan as the "lead goose," followed by the Asian NIEs, followed further by ASEAN and
China.44
In the early 1990s, this concept became enshrined as official policy toward the region.
Thus, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki told a Southeast Asian audience that
Japan will .... continue to seek to expand imports from the countries of the
region and promote greater investment in and technology transfer to these
countries, in line with the maturity of their trade structure and their stage of
development. And as the necessary complement to this effort, I hope that
the host countries will make an even greater effort to create a climate
receptive to Japanese investment and technology transfer.45
MITI (now METI) has, from time to time, tried to coordinate this effort to construct a
regional division of labor, or what it officially called "complex international work sharing"
based on "agreed specialization " 46 In the early 1990s, it pushed the New Asian Industries
Development (New AID) plan, an ambitious scheme to coordinate Japan's aid, investment,
and trade policies toward the region. The plan was designed to stimulate export-oriented
manufacturing throughout Asia, and to help Japanese firms upgrade their domestic
operations by transferring labor-intensive production to new offshore facilities. MITI
vowed to implement the program in three phases: 1) collaboration with counterparts in host
countries to identify specific industries that, with some nurturing, might become
internationally competitive; 2) the drafting of proposals to promote those targeted
industries, usually relying on a mixture of "hard infrastructure" (such as roads and
electrical transmission lines) and "soft infrastructure" (such as new Japanese-style
organizations reflecting cooperation between government and business); and 3) issuing yen
loans and dispatching experts to implement these programs.
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MITI's New AID plan was heavily criticized by other ministries in the Japanese
government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which viewed it as an effort to
take over Japan's foreign aid program. So MITI dropped the plan, but not the vision behind
it. That vision, spelled out in its annual statement of policy priorities, continued to be "the
creation of open industrial networks" and "the support of Japanese business activities in
Asia. "47 In the mid-1990s, MITI rolled out a new initiative to export industrial policies to
Asia -- the Cambodia-Laos-Myanmar Working Group (CLM-WG), which sought to
promote the industrialization of those transitional economies. MITI proudly noted that this
new policy group was based in Bangkok, not Tokyo, and insisted that it reflected an equal
partnership between ASEAN (represented by the ASEAN Economic Ministers, or AEM)
and Japan (represented by the MITI). In fact, however, CLM-WG was financed and staffed
exclusively by MITI. 48 The organization soon evolved into the AEM-MITI Economic and
Industrial Cooperation Committee (AMEICC), and broadened its coverage to include all of
Southeast Asia. It also expanded its mission by, for example, pushing for stronger
industrial linkages and more liberal investment policies throughout the region.
Other Japanese government-affiliated groups, such as JICA, also use industrial policies to
try to guide host states and local firms in Asia. In the mid-1990s, as Japanese assemblers
sought to replicate their domestic keiretsu networks in Asia, this guidance often centered
on how to develop supporting industries -- particularly in the consumer electronics and
automobile industries. For example, a JICA team in Thailand produced a detailed study
that led, in 1995, to the Thai Ministry of Industry's "Master Plan for Supporting
Industries.4 9 In addition, a JICA representative (the former director-general of MITI's
Consumer Goods Bureau) began advising the Thai government in 1998 on how to set up a
public finance corporation for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).5 0 MITI/METI,
however, remains the most active agent in establishing and implementing this agenda. It
has, for example, created a regional council, including government and industry officials
from ASEAN countries, as well as government and industry officials from Japan, to
propose policies designed to foster the growth of SMEs in Southeast Asia.5 1
Under MITI/METI's guidance, Japanese business groups have encouraged their Asian
counterparts to build up not only nationally-based trade associations but also, for the first
time, regionwide industrial associations that directly reflect Japanese business interests.
Thus, the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) encouraged automakers
in Southeast Asia to reorganize and revitalize their flagging ASEAN Automobile
Federation (AAF); the Japan Electrical Manufacturers Association (JEMA) and Electric
Industries Association of Japan (EIAJ) joined forces with Asian manufacturers to establish
a new regional grouping, Business Dialogue; and the Communications Industry
Association of Japan (CIAJ) launched the Asian Telecommunications Industry Exchange. 52
A major purpose of the new regional organizations is to harmonize product and safety
standards as well as certification procedures among members. MITI noted that, although
U.S. standards often become defacto global standards, the European Union has moved to
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establish its own regional standards in some fields. It stressed, "There is an urgent need to
create standards based on the particular requirements of the Asia-Pacific region."53
Japanese bureaucrats advise not only host states and industries in Asia, but also Japanese
firms seeking to invest in Asia, as well as Japanese firms that already have invested in
Asia. When conducted in Japan, this guidance often takes the form of business counseling,
and is directed at SMEs looking for tips on suitable industrial sites and possible joint
venture partners. Indeed, the government now publishes a manual describing all the
programs available to smaller firms contemplating a move overseas. The manual
(Chush6kigy6 Kokusaika Shien Manyuaru) was only 63 pages in 1996, when it was first
published by MITI's SME Agency. Two years later, it was 116 pages.
In some cases, however, administrative guidance is aimed at large firms, and may be used
to encourage cooperative or even collusive behavior. That was the case in 1992, when
MITI called together representatives of the consumer electronics industry and tried to reach
a loose agreement on which companies would invest how much money to manufacture
what products in which countries.54
Outside Japan, MITI/METI uses another one of its arms, JETRO (Japan External Trade
Organization), which operates 10 support centers throughout Asia, to guide Japanese firms
that have already built factories.5 In 1990, it announced a plan to create public-private
councils in major cities throughout the region to provide what it called "local guidance" to
those affiliates.56 And more recently, in 1996, it set up the Asian Industrial Network
Program to pool information on suppliers and joint venture partners.5 7 JETRO has
provided an important coordinating function for Japanese affiliates in Asia; for example, in
1991 it helped broker an informal agreement among Japanese electronic manufacturers in
Malaysia that led to a wage cartel curbing competition for the scarce supply of electrical
engineers in that country.5 8 The Japanese government defends its role in brokering such
overseas agreements by citing the threat presented by "excess competition" between
Japanese MNCs in host economies.5 9
Guidance may also be packaged in the form of financial incentives. In a sharp contrast with
its Western counterparts, the Japanese state actively subsidizes private overseas
investment, particularly FDI to Asia. This is a source of pride for the Japan Export-Import
Bank, which notes that "the use of public funds to finance private overseas investment is
relatively unique to Japan, with almost no parallel in other countries." 60 While the
government's share of FDI financing has diminished in recent years as firms have drawn
more heavily on their own resources and on commercial banks (particularly Japanese banks
that have set up branches in Asia), its absolute contributions have actually grown quite
substantially. In addition, the relative weight of FDI financing in total government lending
activity also has increased. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Export-Import Bank began to
shift its focus from export credits to overseas investment loans -- especially to Japanese
firms setting up shop in Asia. By 1996, it was lending $331 billion to support private
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investment in the region -- double what it lent in 1993 and 28 times what it lent in 1986. As
Table 3 shows, such financing for regionalization became nearly a quarter of the bank's
total business by that time.
Besides the Export-Import Bank, which deals mainly with large firms, three government-
affiliated financial institutions have used public funds (postal savings) from the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Program, a key vehicle of industrial policy during the 1950s and 60s,
to guide small and medium-sized enterprises into Asia.61 Those banks (Sh6k6 Chfikin; the
Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business; and the People's Finance Corporation)
have been given new or expanded responsibilities -- in large part due to the credit squeeze
facing SMEs during the long economic recession in Japan, but also in part due to the new
emphasis on encouraging regionalization.
For example, under a law passed in 1987 and revised in 1995, these government banks are
now specifically authorized to subsidize efforts by small firms to enter new fields --
including, literally, foreign fields. This program was intended to help SMEs cope with the
ongoing process of "hollowing out," a process that, for them, means the loss of domestic
markets as their Japanese customers (often assemblers of automobiles or electronic goods)
move overseas. Ironically, though, it includes a remedy that contributes to the larger
problem of"hollowing out." The Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business (JFS) has
been the most aggressive lender, using nearly 70 billion yen to finance 844 overseas
investment projects between 1987 and 1996. And 90 percent of those projects have been in
Asia.
Business-Business Ties
In the 1990s, Asia emerged as the overseas base for Japanese subcontractors in a variety of
machine manufacturing industries. For example, between 1992 and 1994, Japanese
affiliates manufacturing electronic components in places such as Bangkok and Penang saw
their sales go up by 41 percent while their parent companies in Japan saw sales fall by 8
percent.6 2 This disparity in sales was especially marked in such high-tech fields as
computer parts (a 101 percent increase for Japanese affiliates in Asia; a 14 percent drop for
Japanese parents at home).
Equally explosive was the expansion of Japanese automobile parts suppliers into Asia. In
the 35 years from 1962 through 1997, Japanese auto parts producers made 405 investments
in the ASEAN-4 countries of Southeast Asia (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines); but they made 223 of those investments (or 55 percent) in the final six-year
period from 1991 through 1997.63 1996 was the peak. Of new overseas production bases
established by Japanese auto parts manufacturers that year, 76 percent were in Asia.64
Indeed, the region has attracted the lion share of overseas manufacturing investment by
small and medium-sized firms from Japan. In 1994, 81 percent of FDI projects undertaken
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by Japanese SMEs ended up in Asia; even in 1997, 55.3 percent chose this region in spite
of its economic woes.65
This concentration of investment did not occur by accident. In the 1990s, Japanese
machinery assemblers sought to consolidate their regional production networks by
purchasing parts from Japanese-affiliated suppliers in host economies. Purely local
suppliers apparently could not meet exacting standards for quality and punctuality, and a
highly valued yen raised the cost of importing parts from Japan. So "parent" firms
(machinery assemblers) leaned on their subcontractors to follow them into Asia.
One that felt the pressure was Nippon Electronics, a relatively large producer of printed
circuit boards for Japanese electronics manufacturers such as Sony, Matsushita, and Sanyo.
Although it fully expected to end up losing money in the short run if it built a factory in
Malaysia, it decided to make the move anyway. The company felt it had a "responsibility"
(sekinin) to its longtime customers, according to Takano Tatsuo, managing director of the
subsidiary outside Kuala Lumpur.
For several years, our [Japanese] customers in Southeast Asia asked us to
come and support them. They asked and asked, and finally we came. We
had no choice really.66
Regionalization has helped cement relations between assemblers and their key suppliers in
Japan, relations that had threatened to unravel during the 1990s and the protracted
slowdown in the domestic economy. This is in fact a stated goal of the MITI (now METI)
agency that oversees relations between manufacturing assemblers and subcontractors in
Japan. In one report, the agency encourages suppliers to "become part of the supply
architecture of globally based parent companies" and thereby maintain or perhaps even
strengthen ties with their customers or "parents." 6 7
These linkages inspired Adachi to refer to Japanese manufacturing investment in Asia as
"convoy-style" (sendan-gata) FDI because it typically is carried out by an assembler
followed closely by his most trusted (first and perhaps second tier) suppliers.6 8 This
became especially apparent in the 1990s. Table 4 presents the findings of a survey showing
that, by 1995, as many as 32.5 percent of all Japanese firms investing in the ASEAN-4 and
as many as 21.3 percent of those investing in China indicated they had decided to make the
move to "supply parts to an assembly manufacturer," meaning -- in nearly all cases -- a
Japanese transplant.6 9 This marked a dramatic increase over previous years.
Far from abandoning their homegrown vertical keiretsu, then, Japanese manufacturers have
tried to replicate them - and deploy them strategically - as they expand into Asia. In one
statistical study, Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao (1998) use a probability test to explain
the variation in local content ratios (measured both by local value added and the
procurement of inputs from local suppliers) of 157 Japanese electronics manufacturers
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operating in Asia in 1992. They find that membership in a vertical keiretsu, especially one
with strong intra-group ties, leads to increased local content, particularly for Japanese
affiliates operating in places such as Southeast Asia and China, where the indigenous
supply base remains weak. This, they conclude, reflects the fact that Japanese MNCs have
recreated their supply networks "mostly .... through the establishment of overseas
manufacturing plants by existing Japanese manufacturers of parts and components, in
which the latter were often assisted by the 'core' firm of the keiretsu." 7 0
The strongest Japanese automakers have made the most significant progress in replicating
their domestic keiretsu in Asia. At its manufacturing affiliate in Samutprakarn, just outside
Bangkok, Toyota assembles vehicles with the help of 32 Japanese parts suppliers operating
in Thailand. All but four of these suppliers are members of the Toyota supply keiretsu in
Japan. 71 Likewise, the giant automaker has moved into the Chinese port city of Tianjin
with 14 of its most important Japanese suppliers to manufacture passenger vehicles.
Toyota, according to one news report, is "rebuilding its keiretsu supply system" in
Tianjin.
Others have unearthed equally compelling evidence that Japanese automakers are
attempting to bring core members of their domestic supply networks with them as they
expand into Asia. Nishioka (1998: 66), focusing on ASEAN, concluded that, "with the
exception of those cases in which an established supplier has stayed home, we find very
few examples of Japanese automakers [in Southeast Asia] engaging in transactions outside
their established keiretsu groups." Likewise, Kasahara (1997: 22) argues that Japanese
automakers in Thailand are seeking to capture "relational rents" by conducting almost all
of their business with Japanese subcontractors who belong to their parent firm's keiretsu
network.
As they have done at home, Japanese automakers have established cohesive supply groups
in each Asian country in which they operate. These groups, which meet regularly under the
auspices of the assembler, even carry the same name as the vertical keiretsu in Japan after
which they are patterned. Some observers, however, have suggested that Japanese
automobile supply networks in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia are more "open" and less
exclusionary than supply networks in Japan.7 This observation ignores the fact that
automobile markets in Asia are still tiny compared to the Japanese market and that parts
suppliers, as a result, are unable to achieve economies of scale -- and thus unable to operate
at maximum efficiency -- without selling to a longer list of customers. Indeed,
representatives of Japanese automakers in Asia confided that, when their keiretsu suppliers
first followed them into the region, they encouraged those suppliers to sell parts to other
automakers as well. In the words of one such representative: "We wanted them to get to the
point where they could be really efficient and produce parts cheaply. They couldn't get
there by relying solely on us."74
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In the long run, as automobile markets in the region expand, we should find that the
membership of these Asian supply groups begin to resemble the membership of
corresponding networks in Japan. That is, the need to engage in extra-keiretsu transactions
will lessen as suppliers begin to achieve economies of scale by selling only -- or chiefly --
to their primary customers.7 5 Higashi (1995: 46-7) states this most simply: "As the market
grows, the emphasis on group-ka (tighter ties inside the group) also grows."
Management and Labor
Japanese manufacturers have incorporated their Asian operations into regionwide
personnel systems that allow them to better protect the job security of core or lifetime
workers. In this way, the regionalization of Japanese manufacturing has helped block or
inhibit structural change in the Japanese employment system. More specifically, it has
helped maintain the strong relational ties that have bound longtime employees to their
employers.
During the protracted economic slump of the 1990s, the managers of those manufacturing
firms scrambled to cut production costs, especially labor costs. Due to longstanding norms
and institutions in the domestic political economy of Japan, however, they were not
inclined to lay off core or lifetime workers. Instead, they relied on less drastic means such
as shukk6 ("seconding," or the temporary transfer of employees) -- including what could be
called "cross-border shukk6" -- to trim their payrolls. Asia, home to an expanding list of
Japanese manufacturing affiliates, has thus served as a holding pen, a place to store surplus
white-collar workers from Japan.
In the mid-1990s, when Asia was still booming, Honda transferred a large number of
supervisors from Japan to its affiliates in the region, especially Thailand. This eased some
of the growing pressure at home, according to a Honda spokesman. "Our network of
operations [in Asia] provides more flexibility in personnel management. "76
Nissan used its Asian affiliates in much the same way. "We have too many managers at
Nissan Motors in Japan," confides an executive for the automaker. "Our overseas
operations give us a convenient way to relieve this excess supply of management staff."77
In the 1990s, when it struggled to reduce its domestic employment by 10,000 workers,
Hitachi relied heavily on natural attrition, an early retirement program, and temporary
transfers, including cross-border shukk6.78 In 1991, the electronics giant had 450 Japanese
managers stationed overseas, including Asia; by 1996, that number had nearly doubled to
830. Hitachi's experience is not extraordinary. As Table 5 shows, the total number of
Japanese employees at private firms in Asia increased almost twofold over that period,
reaching 103,688 by 1996.79
Cross-border shukk6 can, of course, move in either direction. Parent companies in Japan,
using what they call "on-the-job training programs," routinely import less-skilled Asian
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workers from their regional affiliates and put them to work on home-based assembly lines,
and particularly in "3 K" jobs (that is, kiken, kitsui, kitanai; or in English, dangerous,
difficult, and dirty jobs). This can happen either when the supply of Japanese workers
willing to perform such labor in Japan is low, or -- as we shall see below -- when the
supply of Asian workers at overseas affiliates becomes excessive. For example, in 1992,
Toyota sent about 200 workers from its assembly plant in Indonesia to its plants in Japan to
receive on-the-job training. This was double the number of"trainees" sent in an average
year. Why? Nakamura and Padang provide a succinct explanation: The parent company in
Japan "was experiencing a boom and faced a shortage of manpower ... [while its affiliate in
Indonesia] did not have favorable market conditions and suffered from excessive
manpower." 80 In addition, parent companies in Japan may move export-oriented assembly
lines -- and thus jobs -- back to Japan when relative costs shift in response to exchange rate
adjustments. For example, in 1997, when the yen weakened against the dollar, Matsushita
moved its production of 16 inch and 25 inch color TV sets back to Japan from Malaysia --
even though it anticipated having to run its Japanese plants at a loss for at least a short
time. It did so because it wanted to protect domestic jobs, according to Shirafuji Hiroyuki,
managing director of Matsushita TV.8 '
Thanks to this ongoing concern about domestic employment, leading Japanese labor
organizations have been able to express qualified support for business plans to
"rationalize" production activities through regionalization. In one report, Denki Reng6 --
the Electrical Workers Union, a subset of the conservative Reng6 (Japan Trade Union
Confederation) -- argues that Japanese manufacturing investment in Asia, carried out as
part of a regional division of labor, can actually protect the jobs of skilled core employees
in Japan. 82 This position is quite different from the one taken by Reng6's U.S. counterpart,
the AFL-CIO, in the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement.
4. The Asian Fiscal Crisis
In 1997, a fiscal crisis spread like a virus through much of Asia, enfeebling what until then
had looked like healthy, even vibrant economies. Surprisingly, though, the crisis did not
undermine ongoing efforts to regionalize relationalism. Japanese business and political
elites used extraordinary measures to cope with the collapse of markets in Asia and, in the
process, may actually have increased Japan's influence in the region. For example, between
November 1997 and January 1999, 244 joint ventures in Thailand received life-saving
transfusions of capital from their foreign parents -- and nearly two-thirds of that money
came from Japan. 83 In other words, while many American, European, and Korean
manufacturers reduced their presence in the market, Japanese MNCs held on for dear life.84
By late 1999, when the crisis showed signs of easing, this "hang-tough" strategy was
already paying off. In Thailand, Mitsubishi Motors was preparing to quadruple its annual
production of automobiles and was moving ahead with plans to use some of its increased
capacity to build an "Asian car." 85 In Indonesia, Toshiba was able to begin expanding
production of cathode ray tubes for color TVs after Korean producers closed their assembly
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lines. "In some areas, we are facing less competition," said Tsubota Yutaka, manager of the
conglomerate's Asian operations. 86 "We are already as profitable [in the region] as we were
before the crisis." Toshiba apparently is not alone. JETRO reports that 75 percent of
Japanese manufacturers in Southeast Asia expected to break even or turn a profit in 1999.87
In the face of this crisis, Japanese manufacturers managed to hold onto their all-important
supply networks in Asia. For example, in Thailand, where scores of local suppliers went
bankrupt and an equivalent number of foreign suppliers shut down their factories, not a
single Japanese parts producer gave up -- despite having to operate at sometimes as little as
20 percent of production capacity.88 How did they do it? The answer reveals an interesting
twist: In this instance, relationalism actually bailed out regionalization.
Consider what happened in the automobile industry. Parent companies in Japan pursued a
three-pronged strategy to help Japanese subcontractors in Asia.
· First, they provided emergency financial assistance to members of their regional
supply groups. Toyota, for example, agreed to make advance payments to its
parts producers throughout Asia, and financed critical but short-run expenses
such as the lease of equipment. 89 Nissan also came to the defense of its
beleaguered parts suppliers in Thailand, subsidizing up to $26 million in
production there.9 0
* Second, to breathe some life into an otherwise flat market, the parent companies
temporarily assigned to their affiliates in Asia some of the production chores
that had, until then, been done entirely in Japan. Toyota, for example, gave its
Thai affiliate the responsibility of manufacturing -- and then exporting -- a line
of pick-up trucks. Stanley Electric transferred a share of the production of
headlights to its affiliate in Thailand.9 1 Mitsuba, meanwhile, turned over all
production of IC flasher relays to its Thai affiliate, which then exported the
goods back to Japan.9 2
* Third, parent firms dramatically boosted the import of parts from struggling
parts suppliers in Asia. Toyota was buying only 2.5 billion yen worth of auto
parts from Japanese subcontractors in Asia in 1997, when the region's
economic crisis began; by 2000, however, it was planning to import auto parts
valued at 14 billion yen -- a nearly six-fold increase.93 In just one year (1998),
Honda increased its import of auto parts manufactured in Thailand by 150
percent.94 MMC, likewise, began importing parts from Japanese suppliers in
Thailand and using them in its Galant, produced in the U.S., and its Lancer,
produced in Japan (Mori 1999: 23).
To ride out the economic storm in Asia, Japanese automakers had to do more than just
shore up their supply base; they also had to hang onto their labor force. Here, too,
regionalized relationalism came in handy. To cite just one example, Toyota officials boast
that they did not lay off regular employees in Southeast Asia during the crisis -- even
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though they had to suspend production at several factories.9 5 One reason they were able to
fulfill their pledge of protecting jobs was that they dramatically expanded their program of
sending overseas employees to Japan for training. In 1998, at the peak of the crisis, Toyota
doubled the number of Southeast Asians in its training program (from 250 to 500), and
doubled the amount of time spent in Japan (from an average of three months to an average
of six months) (Fourin 1998b: 6). The Japanese state helped finance this and other training
programs through the Association for Overseas Technical Scholarships, an arm of MITI
(now METI).
For Japan's political elites, the economic crisis in Asia has presented a difficult challenge,
but also a golden opportunity. "Our status in the region has increased, and so has our
budget at home," boasted one official.96 MITI/METI, in particular, has used the crisis as a
pretext to aggressively pursue its controversial scheme of implementing a regionwide
industrial policy. It has convened "joint public-private sector dialogues" under the auspices
of AMEICC in Bangkok to consider how it can work with state officials in each country to
help "guide" investments that will contribute to the development of the entire region.
To promote economic recovery, Japan announced in 1998 that it would dramatically
increase the flow of ODA loans and grants, as well as technical assistance, to its hardest-hit
neighbors in Asia. On its face, the emergency plan to spend $80 billion over 10 years
seems undeniably generous. But upon closer inspection, one finds that it includes a number
of items designed to strengthen relational ties between the Japanese state and Japanese
industry, as well as to help maintain interfirm and labor-management ties.
First, the aid package renews the controversial practice of"tying;" that is, providing
financing for a project only on the condition that it is carried out by home country firms.
Asian countries hit by the crisis will receive a total of $6 billion in "special loans" over
three years for equipment purchased from Japanese suppliers or for public works
performed by Japanese contractors.9 7
Second, the package makes it possible to dispatch an unprecedented number of JICA
experts to Asia, providing advice to host country officials on everything from industrial
structure reform to trade finance.9 8 This advice, as noted earlier, tends to favor the interests
of Japanese MNCs operating in those countries. And in the case of a new program
proposed by the head of Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers Associations), this
advice will also serve the interests of some firms remaining in Japan. For the first time
ever, the government is recruiting "white collar experts" from Japan's private sector --
particularly its financial institutions -- to provide guidance to Asian governments on such
matters as accounting and auditing. All of the volunteers -- an estimated 1,000 each year --
are between the ages of 40 and 69; many, it turns out, have been rendered superfluous by
the hard economic times in Japan. For this reason, says a JICA official, the program can
help Japanese firms as well as Asian governments. "In most of these Asian countries, there
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is a serious shortage of administrators trained in fields such as financial management. On
the other hand, in Japan, we now have an excess number of such people."9 9
Finally, the massive aid package includes a significant amount of financing for Japanese
firms in Asia, particularly the SMEs that make up an all-important supply base for
machinery assemblers and that might otherwise be tempted to withdraw from the region.
Some of this money goes to host governments, which in turn loan it to private interests.
Malaysia, for example, is receiving such a "two-step" loan ($160 million in 1999) for
SMEs, and especially Japanese suppliers, suffering from a credit crunch in that country.
Much of the money, however, is channeled to Japanese firms through government-
affiliated banks in Tokyo. For example, as of July 1999, the Export-Import Bank of Japan
had agreed to provide $900 million in additional assistance to Japanese affiliates in
Indonesia through what it calls "investment financing." ° °00
Furthermore, these government-affiliated banks are now authorized to not only subsidize
new overseas investment for plant and equipment, but also to provide operating funds for
Japanese SMEs in jeopardy of closing down existing facilities in Asia. Government money
is loaned to the parent company in Japan, which is then expected to inject capital into its
affiliate in Asia. In just the first three months of 1999, JFS loaned nearly $10 million to
keep 14 affiliates afloat.l 01
In addition, MITI/METI has tried to maintain investment in Asia by expanding its already
generous program insuring foreign bank loans for the overseas activities of Japanese
affiliates. In March 1998, the government announced it would begin to cover ordinary
credit risks, such as the bankruptcy of an overseas affiliate borrowing money.10 2 Then, a
few months later, it announced it would relax the insurance program further by eliminating
the requirement that Japanese parent firms participate in providing up-front guarantees for
overseas loans made to their affiliates.'0 3
The Japanese government has not tried to disguise the fact that its massive bailout plan for
Asia is also designed to help Japanese industry. Indeed, when he announced his $30 billion
piece of the package in 1998, Finance Minister Miyazawa Kiichi noted candidly that a
substantial sum would go to Japanese SMEs. The government justified the expenditures in
these terms:
Japanese companies, which have contributed greatly to the economies of
these countries, are also facing difficulties due to the economic crisis. If this
situation continues, it would be difficult to invigorate these economies with
new economic activity, with the strong possibility that many companies
might have to pull out of the region. This would be damaging to the local
economies, and could possibly have damaging effects on the bilateral




In a 1993 interview, K6zuki Yatsugu, the former president of the Japanese Chamber of
Commerce and Industry in Singapore, argued that Japan must regionalize carefully -- or
risk losing its technological autonomy. Parent firms, he advised, should not give up too
much authority to their local affiliates.
In my personal opinion, we should keep the control in Japan. Once you lose
that control, that power, it never comes back. It never returns. All you have
to do is look at what happened to England in the late nineteenth century, or
what is happening to the United States today.' 05
K6zuki's view reflects what Samuels has identified as a longstanding ideology of techno-
nationalism, a belief that a nation's security depends fundamentally on its overall
technological capacity.'0 6 This ideology, used by Meiji elites to promote industrialization
in the late 19th century, informed domestic institutions in the postwar period as Japan
raced to catch-up with the United States. And more recently, this ideology has informed the
corporate strategies of Japanese MNCs operating in Asia, where they have proven reluctant
to set up overseas R&D facilities and to use indigenous suppliers, and where they have
moved slowly to localize management. Instead, Japanese multinationals in this region have
continued to rely on longstanding relational ties with co-nationals. As Itami puts it, "the
East Asian networks of Japanese corporations are integrated extensions of domestic
production systems."'0 7
Let us first consider the use of subcontractors in Asia. JETRO reports that 47 percent of the
nearly 900 Japanese manufacturing affiliates it surveyed in Southeast Asia in 1998 were
relying on Japanese transplants for most of their locally purchased parts and materials.'0 8
And in certain industries, this figure is much higher. For example, 100 percent of Japanese
automakers in Thailand and 88 percent of Japanese electronics manufacturers in Indonesia
reported that they relied on Japanese suppliers for at least half of their local inputs. In a
study commissioned by the government of Thailand, the Foreign Investment Advisory
Service finds that Japanese affiliates in Asia's electronics industry "tend to bring their own
subcontractors from Japan or create their own satellite subcontractors, neither of which
generates significant backward linkages with domestic firms."10 9 Likewise, Okamoto
expresses concern that export-oriented production by Japanese electronic firms in
Southeast Asia is carried out in "enclaves" that are well connected to Japanese
subcontractors in the region, but rather poorly connected to truly local firms.' 0
The automobile industry is no different. Kumon (1997: 161) visited dozens of Japanese car
and truck manufacturers in Asia and found that, in parts purchasing, they have a "high
dependency on Japanese or Japanese-affiliated suppliers." Ueno reports that up to 70
percent of the "local" suppliers used by Japanese assemblers in the ASEAN-4 are, in
reality, Japanese transplants.1 ' And FIAS argues that Japanese automakers in that country
deliberately avoid Thai suppliers: "One local producer claims he was excluded from the
21
_I__ II
OEM market by a Japanese assembler until he could prove, by using a Japanese testing
company, that his components were of higher quality than those Japanese components
being used by the assembler at that time." l 12
Now let us consider progress (or lack of progress) toward the hiring of local management
staff. Japanese MNCs must pay much higher salaries and benefits to their expatriate
managers than to their local managers at overseas affiliates -- in some cases, as much as 10
times higher. Furthermore, they receive relentless criticism from host government officials
for using Japanese rather than local staff at their operations in Asia. Given these two
constraints, one would expect to find a steady reduction in the share of these expatriate
managers.
But there has been no real progress on this front -- despite frequent promises by parent
companies that they will "localize" (genchika) their Asian operations. Japanese expats held
more than 13 percent of the management positions at Japanese manufacturing affiliates in
the region in 1995 - a small decrease from 1989, when they held 15 percent of the
positions.' 13 This phenomenon is evident not only in wholly owned subsidiaries but also in
joint ventures in which the Japanese partner owns less than 50 percent of the stock. "In
places like Indonesia and the Philippines, where we do not have a majority of the equity,"
says Akira Yokoi, vice-president for international affairs at Toyota, "we are still able to
aggressively send in our own management team and maintain control.' '1l 4 Even in those
rare instances in which an Asian manager ends up in charge of production, finance or some
other important division in a Japanese subsidiary or joint venture, he often is paired with an
expatriate manager, who serves as a "big brother" or adviser."l 5
The net result is that regionalization has not led to a serious "hollowing out" of the
Japanese economy. Manufacturing continues to account for nearly one-quarter of nominal
GDP in Japan -- a higher share than in almost all other mature or "post-industrial"
economies, including the United Kingdom (21 percent), France (18 percent) and the United
States (17 percent). 16 By expanding into Asia with the help of existing relational ties,
Japanese MNCs have reduced both production costs and job losses at home. And they have
limited technology "leakage" to potential rivals in Asia.
Indeed, it is instructive to note that, in 1995, intra-firm technology licensing (from parent to
affiliate) began to account for more than half of the total technology exports from Japan to
Asia." 7 Although intra-network exports are not counted, and thus defy quantification, one
can surmise that such exports account for much of the remainder. This means, then, that
Japanese technology licensing to Asia is rarely conducted in the "unrelational" spot market.
6. The Costs of Continuity
If its manufacturing base is not "hollowing out," and its technological resources are not
"leaking" out, then Japan must be benefiting from the preservation -- via regionalization --
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of its existing techno-industrial regime, right? Wrong. As discussed earlier, the costs of
strong ties begin to outweigh the benefits in a developed or "mature" economy like Japan.
This is because firms no longer can simply adopt existing technology and transfer it to
related firms; they now must pursue radical innovation. That is, they must acquire and
develop new ideas, new information in an environment of technological uncertainty. But
firms in a highly relational regime are handicapped in such an environment; they are bound
together by strong ties and thus less receptive to market signals and creative inputs that
could contribute to technical breakthroughs or radical innovation.
Japan sits today on the cutting edge of the global technology frontier. It is a fully developed
economy whose manufacturing firms, to compete, must develop new technologies and
introduce new products. But because these firms commit themselves to long-term,
reciprocal relationships, they often cannot freely take such bold steps. Relationalism, which
in the past had yielded net gains through lower transaction costs, now generates net losses
through higher opportunity costs.
A cursory glance at R&D data suggests that Japan is holding its own as a technological
powerhouse in the global economy. Indeed, it spent 3.06 percent of its GDP on research
and development in 1998 - more than the U.S. (2.59 percent), and other industrialized
economies. And this represented an increase from 1990, when Japan's R&D/GDP ratio
was 2.85 percent. 18 But this statistic obscures the fact that Japan is lagging further and
further behind in basic research - precisely the area where it most needs to focus. 19
In the mid-1980s, the public and private sectors in Japan spent about 13 percent of their
R&D budgets on basic research - about the same as in the U.S, but lower than in German
and France (about 20 percent). In the late 1990s, the share of overall R&D expenditures
allocated to basic research remained about the same in Japan, but increased in the U.S. (to
about 16 percent) as well as in Germany and France (to about 22 percent). 120
Japan's performance in this critical area would have fallen even further behind had it not
been for a massive and steady increase in government spending under the 1996 Science and
Technology Basic Plan. 12 1 Japanese producers have slashed basic research expenditures,
choosing instead to dedicate resources to the development of new applications with old
technologies. In one survey, the Society for the Promotion of Machine Industries found that
most Japanese firms were content to continue utilizing existing know-how. Fewer than 27
percent of firms were planning to innovate. 122
R&D "intensity" (research and development expenditures as a percentage of total sales)
actually declined in the manufacturing sector during the late 1980s and early 1990s,
according to Watanabe and Hemmert. 23 At the same time, they note, R&D's share in total
manufacturing investment fell from 13.2 percent in 1987 to 8.9 percent in 1994. The two
researchers trace this slowdown in R&D activity to the heady bubble years, when
manufacturers focused on expanding production capacity - in Japan as well as overseas -
rather than innovating. In the 1990s, then, firms had to try to compete without the benefit
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of innovations that could or should have been made in the late 1980s. "In other words,"
Watanabe and Hemmert assert, "the long-lasting virtuous circle between capital investment
and technological advance appears to be on the verge of collapse."' 24
Although some have suggested that Japanese academics are beginning to collaborate
regularly with manufacturers on basic research (or at least on the publication of technical
papers' 2 5), the results continue to disappoint. Japan has more than twice as many scientists
and engineers as Germany, and nearly four times the number in France, but the productivity
of their research is quite low. Boyer has shown that Japan in the mid- 1990s produced half
as many research articles -- on a per capita basis -- as Germany, and only about one third as
many as France.' 26 And the research environment does not seem to be improving. Since
1985, the number of scientists and engineers leaving Japan to pursue research elsewhere
has exceeded the number of scientists and engineers coming to Japan. And the gap is
growing wider each year; in 1995, the "brain drain" was equivalent to a net loss of 110,000
people.' 27
For Japanese firms, the bottom line here is reduced competitiveness.'2 8 In the first half of
the 1990s, value added by manufacturers of general machinery and precision instruments
fell 20 percent; value added by manufacturers of transportation equipment fell 13
percent.' 29 Of the four major machinery industries, only electronics managed to achieve
growth. But this was due primarily to a temporary surge in domestic demand for computer
and telecommunication equipment in the early 1990s; indeed, the industry's fortunes
quickly soured in the second half of the 1990s as demand collapsed. Profits in these
machinery industries plummeted nearly 60 percent in the first half of the decade, then
recovered a little in 1996 -- only to fall sharply again.
For Japan as a whole, this means sluggish economic growth today and into the near future
as Japanese firms move too slowly to upgrade their technological capabilities. From 1991
through 1999, Japan's economy managed to grow (on average) by only 1.3 percent a year --
less than any other industrialized economy in the world. And at the end of what has come
to be called the "lost decade" of the 1990s, it just barely avoided the dubious distinction of
being the only economy since the global depression of the 1930s to experience three
consecutive years of contraction.
The Japan Center for Economic Research expects the pain to get worse before it gets
better; it estimates that the Japanese economy will barely hold its own until 2005, then
slow by an average rate of 0.1 percent a year until 2015, and slow even more (0.2 percent a
year) until 2025.'3 ° Exports, which had provided a welcome boost at various times in the
past, no longer can do the trick. Japanese exports, as it turns out, are heavily concentrated
in sectors with low growth intensity; Legewie reports that, in 1992, only 5 percent of those
exports belonged to product groups that had enjoyed high performance.' 3 Rather than
exports, it was extraordinary government spending on public works -- enough to push the
budget deficit up to 9.4 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2000 -- that kept the economy from
collapsing in the 1990s.
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In the race to develop state-of-the-art technology, how did Japan, which only a decade
earlier looked like a sure winner, manage to fall behind? Some blame the Japanese system
of higher education, which they say fails to promote independent scholarly research at a
sufficiently advanced level.' 32 Others, including the Japanese government, blame Japanese
culture in general, saying it is conformist and thus stifles creativity.'3 3 But these
explanations fall short because they cannot tell us why success in Japan's case so quickly
turned to failure. The answer has more to do with the institutions -- or, more specifically,
the network structures -- that make up relationalism in Japan.
State-industry cooperation, which worked so well when public and private technocrats
could see the technological road ahead, now impedes the important signaling function of
the market, which provides "bottom-up" information on consumer needs and wants to
producers. Inter-firm linkages, while facilitating the diffusion of already developed
technology through established networks, nonetheless limit opportunities for acquiring new
ideas for product, process, and organizational innovation. At the same time, intra-firm
linkages between labor and management, which had promoted teamwork and thus served
to protect the firm's investment in human capital, now inhibit risk-taking in an
environment of technological uncertainty.
In the aggregate, these relational ties form a national system of innovation that is ill
equipped to cope with such uncertainty. This system is founded on what Rtischev and Cole
call "organizational continuity;" that is, it works well when the status quo is stable, but
"less well when there are fundamental and frequent changes in industry standards and
dominant designs."' 34 Okimoto and Nishi make virtually the same argument. Japan's
system of innovation, they argue,
Is not designed to encourage bold new conceptualizing, radical departures
from the prevailing orthodoxy, and freewheeling exploration of territories
unmapped by known theories. Instead, Japanese organization is geared to
operate on the basis of caution, conservatism, and incremental change. It
filters out bold new ideas if those ideas cannot be readily proved. It can be
accommodating in such areas as hardware, because hardware is predictable
and susceptible to design proof; but radical, new concepts seldom pass
through the intricate mechanism of consensual deliberation.' 35
A growing body of literature suggests that, for many countries, small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) represent a vital source of new technology, especially "breakthrough"
innovations.'3 6 In the U.S., for example, Okimoto and Saxonhouse found that SMEs
produce a relatively large number of patents with a relatively small amount of investment
in R&D; in Japan, however, they found that SMEs are not as productive in generating new
technology. Of 34 major technological innovations achieved over a 20-year period in
postwar Japan, SMEs accounted for only two. 37 This finding is confirmed by the Small
25
_ _I 1 _ _ ___
and Medium Enterprise Agency, which reports that 70.6 percent of manufacturing
subcontractors in Japan have never filed a patent. It concludes that "technical development
activity in the small manufacturing sector has fallen to a low ebb."'3 8
In the 1950s and 1960s, Japanese SMEs tended to depend heavily on large firms for
technology, as well as capital and markets. In spite of this, some -- even many -- prospered,
growing into large, independent, innovative firms with names like Canon and Kyocera. But
nowadays, when the economy has matured and growth has slowed overall, powerful
upstarts like these are few and far between. If anything, small manufacturing firms in Japan
today are more likely to shrink than to grow in size.'39 Kiyonari Tadao, the president of
Hosei University, notes that "microenterprises" (tiny start-up ventures) are popping up
virtually everywhere in the industrialized world -- with the exception of Japan, "where
such small businesses are rapidly declining in number."' 4 0
Figure 3 tells this story: The rate at which Japanese entrepreneurs launch new firms has
fallen sharply since the early 1970s, when 7 percent of all firms were start-ups. In the early
1990s, the start-up rate fell below the closure rate for the first time in the postwar period;
this means, of course, that Japanese firms are unable to hold their own and are, in the
aggregate, declining in number. Today, the start-up rate is less than 4 percent (and even
lower for manufacturing) -- well below the U.S. start-up rate of about 14 percent.
Contrary to journalist accounts, Japan has not yet spawned a "venture vanguard" of young,
restless, highly educated, and computer-savvy entrepreneurs like the dot.com generation in
the United States.'4 ' According to the Japanese government's Research Group on New
Business Creation, which conducted a survey of more than 1,000 microenterprises
identified in 1998 by the Nihon Keizai Shinbun as new, fast-paced, and innovating, the
typical venture businessman in Japan is 55; does not have a technical background in
science or engineering (64 percent of the presidents of these venture firms did not); and, in
a surprising number of cases (36 percent), may not even have graduated from a four-year
college. 142 Only 12.5 percent of these firms are involved in information technology.' 4 3
A legacy of relationalism, these new start-ups increasingly tend to be affiliated in some
way with a large firm. Figure 4 documents this ongoing trend. Among start-ups created
since 1991, only 8.7 percent can be classified as truly independent (by contrast, nearly half
of the start-ups founded in the early 1950s were independent). All of the other firms
created in the 1990s are tied to a parent firm: 46.7 percent can be classified as "spin-offs"
(in which an employee retires from an existing firm to start his own); 20.1 percent are
"affiliates" (or, in Japanese, "norenwake," a pattern in which an employee retires from a
firm but intends to maintain a business relationship with his former employer); and 24.5
percent are "directed affiliates" (or, in Japanese, bunsha, a pattern in which an employee




With this in mind, one can safely conclude that relationalism is imposing heavy costs on
the Japanese economy, an economy in which potential entrepreneurs struggle just to line up
qualified suppliers and talented managers. And regionalization is merely preserving the
status quo.
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Figure 1
Diverging Gains: Profit Rates for Large Firms in Japan and the
U.S.
Source: Nomura Research Institute (1999), "Nomura 400," Tokyo, and Standard &
Poor's Corporation (1998), "Standard & Poor's Analyst's Handbook," New York.
Note: The U.S. Data is return on book value for the "Industrials" in the S&P 500; the
Japanese data is return on equity for Nomura's top 400 firms.
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Figure 2
Japanese Manufacturing FDI to Asia
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